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ABSTRACT
International relative prices across industrialized countries show large and systematic deviations from
relative purchasing power parity. We embed a model of imperfect competition and variable markups
in a quantitative model of international trade. We ﬁnd that when our model is parameterized to
match salient features of the data on international trade and market structure in the US, it can
reproduce deviations from relative purchasing power parity similar to those observed in the data
because ﬁrms choose to price-to-market. We then examine how pricing-to-market depends on the
presence of international trade costs and various features of market structure.
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States moved by roughly 40 percent relative to a weighted average of the prices of manu-
factured goods produced by ﬁrms in the main trading partners of the United States. This
large movement in the US producer-price based real exchange rate (PPI-based RER) was not
exceptional. Movements of a similar magnitude occurred again in the late 1990’s and more
recently after 2002. As these data make clear, the price of the basket of goods sold by foreign
manufacturers relative to that sold by US manufacturers is very volatile. In this paper we
examine two questions. First, what impact should we expect these large movements in rel-
ative producer prices to have on the relative prices of goods that are actually traded–that
is, on export and import prices? And second, what impact should we expect these relative
price movements to have on relative consumer prices as measured by the consumer-price
based real exchange rate (CPI-based RER)?
The standard answer to our ﬁrst question is based on the hypothesis of relative purchasing
power parity (relative PPP)–namely, the hypothesis that the relative price of a traded good
sold in two diﬀerent countries should remain constant over time.1 Applied to aggregate price
data, this is the hypothesis that the import prices that consumers in one country pay for
another country’s goods should move one-for-one with the producer prices for goods in those
countries that are the sources of those imports when all of these prices are expressed in a
common currency. Likewise, a country’s export prices should move one-for-one with that
country’s producer prices.2 This hypothesis thus implies that the terms of trade,d e ﬁned as
the ratio of export and import prices for a country relative to its trading partners, should
be as volatile as the PPI-based RER.
The standard answer to our second question is also based on the hypothesis of relative
PPP. By deﬁnition, changes in the consumer price index in each country are a trade-weighted
1The hypothesis of relative purchasing power parity is a generalization of the law of one price in that it
allows for price diﬀerentials across locations that are constant over time.
2This implication can be derived from a large number of open economy macroeconomic models including
those of David K. Backus, Patrick K. Kehoe, and Finn Kydland (1995) and Alan C. Stockman and Linda
L. Tesar (1995).
1average of changes in domestic producer prices and import prices. Hence, under the hypothe-
sis of relative PPP, changes in consumer prices should be a trade-weighted average of changes
in producer prices across countries. Therefore, the CPI-based RER should be smoother than
the PPI-based RER, with the extent of the smoothing depending on the extent of interna-
tional trade.
Data on international relative price ﬂuctuations for developed countries, however, are
not consistent with these two standard answers. First, the terms of trade for manufactured
goods are substantially less volatile than the corresponding PPI-based RER for manufactured
goods. Second, ﬂuctuations in the CPI-based RER for goods are roughly the same size as
those in the PPI-based real exchange rate for manufactured goods. Both of these observations
arise because, at the aggregate level, data on export and import prices show substantial
and systematic deviations from relative PPP in comparison with source country producer
prices.3 In particular, an increase in home producer prices relative to foreign producer prices
is typically associated with an increase in home producer prices relative to export prices,
and an increase in home import prices relative to foreign producer prices.
In this paper, we build a model of international trade and international relative prices to
account for these aggregate price observations. In our model, deviations from relative PPP
arise as a result of the decision of individual ﬁrms to price-to-market in response to aggregate
s h o c k s .H e r ew eu s et h et e r mpricing-to-market to refer to the decision of a single producer
to change the relative price at which he sells his output abroad and at home in response to
changes in international relative costs. Our model is based on two key ingredients: imperfect
competition with variable markups, and international trade costs. It includes a simple yet
rich model of quantity competition à la Cournot in which ﬁrms do not fully pass-through
changes in their marginal costs to their prices because their optimal markup depends on their
market share. We focus on the role of trade costs and various features of market structure
in generating deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate level resulting from the choice
3See, for example, Beverly J. Lapham (1995) and the data presented in Section II of our paper.
2of individual ﬁrms to price-to-market in response to aggregate shocks.
Our model is a quantitative extension of models of international pricing in Rudiger S.
Dornbusch (1987) and Paul R. Krugman (1987). We use a nested constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) demand system that generates variable markups under imperfect competition.
This demand system has previously been studied by Elhanan Helpman and Krugman (1985)
and many others.4 Our model also builds on some recently developed models of international
trade. In particular, our model nests versions of models of trade based on specialization
and monopolistic competition (Helpman and Krugman 1985) and Ricardian models of trade
based on comparative advantage (Dornbusch, Stanley Fischer, and Paul A. Samuelson 1977).
Newly developed versions of these models include work by Jonathan Eaton and Samuel
Kortum (2001); Andrew B. Bernard et al. (2003); Marc J. Melitz (2003); Eaton, Kortum
and Francis Kramarz (2004); Fernando Alvarez and Robert E. Lucas Jr. (2007); and Thomas
Chaney (forthcoming). We follow this recent work in using trade costs to provide a tractable
quantitative account of the patterns of international trade both at the aggregate level and
at the level of the individual producer.5
We show that a version of our model parameterized to match some of the main features
of the data on trade volumes at both the aggregate and ﬁrm level, and to have reasonable
implications for various features of market structure such as the concentration of produc-
tion among producers in a market and the distribution of markups of price over marginal
cost, does reproduce the two main features of the data on international relative prices that
motivate this study. First, the model generates movements in the terms of trade that are
substantially smaller than corresponding movements in the PPI-based RER for manufac-
4Robert C. Feenstra, Joseph E. Gagnon, and Michael M. Knetter (1996); Jiawen Yang (1997); Morten
O. Ravn (2001); and Gordon M. Bodnar, Bernard Dumas, and Richard C. Marston (2002) use a similar
nested CES demand system in models of exchange rate pass-through. Lapham (1995), Paul R. Bergin
and Feenstra (2001), George Alessandria (2004), Giancarlo Corsetti and Luca Dedola (2005), and Rebecca
Hellerstein (2006), among many others, present alternative frameworks for analyzing pass-through in models
of monopolistic competition with nonconstant elasticities of demand.
5Bergin and Reuven Glick (2003) and Fabio Ghironi and Melitz (2005) also study versions of new models
of international trade that can account for some features of ﬂuctuations in international relative prices. Their
main emphasis is on the role of entry and exit of ﬁrms to the export markets.
3tured goods. Second, the model generates movements in the CPI-based RER for goods
that are very similar in magnitude to corresponding movements in the PPI-based RER for
manufactured goods.
We next use the model to assess the extent to which imperfect competition with variable
markups and international trade costs play essential roles in generating these results. We ﬁnd
that both of these features are key in reproducing our two main observations on international
relative prices.
Our model can reproduce the observed aggregate deviations from relative PPP that
underlie our two facts only if ﬁrms in our model practice pricing-to-market. For that, both
trade costs and imperfect competition with variable markups are essential. To see that
imperfect competition with variable markups is essential, observe that if ﬁrms set both
domestic and export prices at constant (but perhaps diﬀerent) markups over marginal cost,
then shocks to the marginal cost of production leave the ratio of export prices to producer
prices for each ﬁrm in each country unchanged. Hence, because price indices are constructed
as weighted averages of price changes at the ﬁrm level, relative PPP holds at the aggregate
level and the PPI-based RER and the terms of trade move one-for-one with each other.
The observation of incomplete pass-through of changes in costs to prices arises quite
naturally in our model with imperfect competition and variable markups. However, this
feature of our model is not, by itself, enough to generate pricing-to-market. To get pricing-
to-market, we must have that a change in costs for one ﬁrm or a group of ﬁrms leads to
a change in markups for those ﬁrms that is diﬀe r e n ti ne a c hm a r k e ti nw h i c ht h e s eﬁrms
compete. For this, we need trade costs.
To see that trade costs are essential, observe that even if ﬁrms charge variable markups
in that they do not raise prices one-for-one with a change in marginal cost, in the absence
of international trade costs, ﬁrms face the same set of competitors (deﬁned by their mar-
ginal costs) when selling at home and abroad, and thus choose identical markups and prices
in both markets. Thus, without international trade costs, even in the presence of variable
4markups that lead to incomplete pass-through, we have no pricing-to-market. Hence, imper-
fect competition with variable markups is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for pricing-to-market.
In an accounting sense, to match the observation that the CPI-based RER for goods
moves roughly one-to-one with the PPI-based RER, we need both that imports form a small
s h a r eo ft h eg o o d sC P I ,a n dt h et e r m so ft r a d et om o v es u b s t a n t i a l l yl e s st h a nt h eP P I -
based RER. In our model, trade costs play the key role in allowing the model to match the
relatively small import share observed in US data.6
We then use the model to assess quantitatively the role of two features of market struc-
ture in generating pricing-to-market in our model. The ﬁrst is the extent of within-sector
cost dispersion across ﬁrms: in our model this cost dispersion determines the extent of mar-
ket concentration, the distribution of markups, and the size and productivity advantages of
exporting versus non-exporting ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that within-sector cost dispersion is quanti-
tatively important in generating our results. In particular, in our model it is only the large
ﬁrms, and not the small ﬁrms, that practice pricing-to-market in the direction suggested by
the aggregate data. We ﬁnd pricing-to-market at the level of the aggregate price indices only
because the pricing practices of the large ﬁrms in the model dominate the price indices. In
contrast, if there is no cost dispersion across ﬁrms and all ﬁrms export, we ﬁnd that there
is no pricing-to-market. We view this ﬁnding that cost dispersion is essential for generat-
ing pricing-to-market under our nested CES demand system as one of our main technical
contributions relative to existing literature that has used this demand system.
The second feature of market structure that we examine is the extent of export partici-
pation by ﬁrms: recent research has found that only a minority of US manufacturing plants
e x p o r ta n yo u t p u ta ta l l . 7 We ﬁnd that this feature of market structure is not quantitatively
important in generating pricing-to-market in our model. In particular, marginal trade costs
are suﬃcient to generate pricing-to-market.
6Doireann Fitzgerald (forthcoming) also discusses this point in detail. Burstein, Martin Eichenbaum, and
Sergio Rebelo (2005) use a related argument to explain low inﬂation after large devaluations.
7See, for example, Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen (2004).
5Since the ﬁnding of pricing-to-market is sensitive to the details of our model, we do not
see our model as a general theory of this pricing practice.8 Nonetheless, we view it as a useful
illustration of pricing-to-market with ﬂexible prices under a demand structure that departs
only minimally from the standard constant elasticity case used in many open macroeconomy
models. Note that pricing-to-market is a characteristic of the literature on exchange rates
and sticky prices.9 Our work is distinguished from this literature in that here, prices are
set optimally every period and not ﬁxed by assumption. We view our model as a useful
illustration that evidence of pricing-to-market can be rationalized in a model with ﬂexible
rather than sticky prices.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We ﬁrst review the observations on international
relative prices that are the focus of this paper. We then present our model. For simplicity,
we abstract from consideration of nontradeable goods and focus on producer and consumer
prices of tradeable goods. We present a parameterization of the model that roughly matches
micro and macro observations on the extent of trade in US manufacturing as well as data on
industry concentration and ﬁrm markups, and then consider the implications of this model
for the movements in the terms of trade, the PPI-based RER, and the CPI-based RER in
response to a change in the relative costs of production across countries. To illustrate the
role of pricing-to-market and international trade costs in the model, we compare our results
to two alternative parameterizations–one in which ﬁrms choose prices that are a constant
markup of prices over marginal cost and another in which there are no international trade
costs. We then explore the pricing implications of our model at the ﬁrm level. Finally, we
conduct a sensitivity analysis of how our quantitative results depend on various features of
market structure.
8Algebraically, pricing-to-market is a change in relative markups at which an exporter sells his output
abroad and at home. Pricing-to-market is sensitive to the details of our model, since the markup change in
each market depends on the shape of the second derivative of demand, as well as the equilibrium change in
ﬁrms’ market shares. In Atkeson and Burstein (2007), we show that pricing-to-market arises quite naturally
in a model with Bertrand competition and limit pricing. These results are not general because they depend
on the assumption on limit pricing.
9See, for example, Caroline M. Betts and Michael B. Devereux (2000); V.V. Chari, Kehoe, and Ellen R.
McGrattan (2002); and Charles Engel (2002).
6I. Data on International Relative Prices
W eb e g i nw i t has h o r tr e v i e wo ft h ed e ﬁnition of the price indices that we consider. As
we discuss in Section IIIC, price indices are constructed directly from changes in individual
prices relative to a base year.10 In particular, the change in the manufacturing PPI is a sales-
weighted average of the change in wholesale prices charged by manufacturing ﬁrms within a
country. For the United States, this price index includes the prices that ﬁrms charge both
for domestic sales and for exports. The change in the manufacturing export price index is a
sales-weighted average of the change in export prices charged by manufacturing ﬁrms within
a country. The change in the manufacturing import price index is an import share—weighted
average of the change in prices charged for imported goods. Finally, the change in the CPI
for goods is an expenditure-weighted average of the change in retail prices consumers pay
for goods, including both domestically produced and imported items.
In this section, we document the two main facts that motivate our study: (1) that the
terms of trade for manufactured goods are signiﬁcantly less volatile than the manufacturing
PPI-based real exchange rate, and (2) that the CPI-based real exchange rate for goods has
roughly the same volatility as the manufacturing PPI-based real exchange rate. We then
a r g u et h a tt h e s et w of a c t sa r i s eb e c a u s eo fs y s t e m a t i cd e v i a t i o n sf r o mr e l a t i v eP P Pf o r
traded goods at the aggregate level–speciﬁcally as a result of systematic ﬂuctuations in the
ratio of export prices to producer prices in each country. We document the magnitude of
these deviations from relative PPP in both country and sectoral level data. In our model,
deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate level arise as a result of the decisions of
individual ﬁrms to price-to-market. We ﬁnish this section with a short literature review of
the evidence for pricing-to-market at the product level.
We now document our ﬁrst main fact.
Fact 1: The manufacturing terms of trade are signiﬁcantly less volatile than
the manufacturing PPI-based real exchange rate.
10Speciﬁcally, the price index in period t r e l a t i v et oab a s ey e a r0, Pt/P0,i sg i v e nb y
P





i siPi0,w h e r esi is the sales weight of good i and Pit is the corresponding price.
7Figure 1 displays quarterly time series, between 1985 and 2006, for the US terms of
trade for manufactured goods and the US manufacturing PPI-based RER. We construct the
terms of trade for manufactured goods as the ratio of manufactured export and import price
indices computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which are available as of 1985.W e
measure the manufacturing PPI-based RER as the ratio of the US producer price index for
manufactured goods to a trade-weighted average of the manufactured goods producer price
indices for the trading partners of the United States, where these price indices are measured
in US dollars. We use import, export, and producer price indices for manufactured goods
to be consistent with our quantitative model and to avoid including oil prices that have a
large impact on the volatility of the overall terms of trade for many countries (see Backus
and Mario J. Crucini 2000).
It can be seen from the ﬁgure that movements in the terms of trade are signiﬁcantly
smaller than movements in the PPI-based RER. For example, between 1985 and 1988, the
US PPI-based RER depreciated by roughly 40 percent, and the terms of trade fell by only
15 percent. Note from the ﬁgure that over the last years, the terms of trade have become
even smoother relative to the PPI-based RER.
We ﬁnd that this fact holds not only for US data but also for other major developed
countries. In the ﬁrst column of Table 1, we report the relative standard deviation of the
manufacturing terms of trade and the manufacturing PPI-based RER for the United States
and six additional countries using quarterly data from various sources within the period
1975—2006. We include additional results in the table for the United States for the period
1985—2006 using manufactured import and export price indices computed by the BLS using
price surveys rather than unit values to construct prices at the lowest level of disaggregation
in the index. We report results based on four-quarter logarithmic changes in relative prices,
as well as for deviations from Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trends. The results in this table indicate
that the terms of trade are consistently between one-third and two-thirds as volatile as the
P P I - b a s e dR E R .I na d d i t i o n ,i nc o l u m n5o fT a b l e1, we report the correlation of the terms
8of trade and the PPI-based RER. These correlations are consistently positive but less than
one.
We now turn to our second main fact:
Fact 2: Fluctuations in CPI-based real exchange rates for goods are roughly
as large as ﬂuctuations in manufacturing PPI-based real exchange rates.
Figure 1 also displays the CPI-based RER for goods for the United States between 1985
and 2006, constructed as ratios of the goods portion of the CPI in the United States to
trade-weighted averages of the goods portion of the CPI in its trading partners (see the
Appendix for a description of the construction of the series in this ﬁgure). This ﬁgure clearly
shows that, for US data, movements in the CPI-based RER for goods are very large, almost
as large as ﬂuctuations in the PPI-based RER for manufactured goods.
In columns 4 and 8 of Table 1, we report the relative standard deviation and the corre-
lation of the CPI-based RER and the manufacturing PPI-based RER for the United States
and six other countries (using four-quarter diﬀerences and deviations from HP trends). For
the United States, in the row covering the period 1985—2006, we use only consumer prices for
goods (as opposed to services) in constructing the CPI-based RER. Due to lack of data, we
do not have CPI-based RERs for goods between 1975 and 2006 for all the countries in Table
1, so for this time period we use data on the overall CPI-based RER (including both goods
and services). However, work by Engel (1999); Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoﬀ (2000);
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002); and Betts and Timothy J. Kehoe (2006), using more
limited data, conﬁrms that ﬂuctuations in the CPI-based RER for goods are very similar
to ﬂuctuations in the overall CPI-based RER. In this table we see that the CPI-based RER
consistently has roughly the same volatility as the PPI-based RER and is nearly perfectly
correlated with it.
We now argue that these two facts arise as a result of systematic deviations from relative
PPP at the aggregate level for goods across countries. Consider our ﬁrst fact. Algebraically,






















In this decomposition, PPI/PPI∗ is the PPI-based RER, EPI/IPI is the terms of trade,
PPI/EPI is the ratio of producer and export prices, and IPI/PPI∗ is the (trade weighted)
ratio of import (foreign country export) and foreign producer prices.11 Here, hats indicate
changes in the logarithm of these variables. Throughout the paper, we assume all prices are
measured in terms of a common currency, and, hence, nominal exchange rates do not appear
in international price ratios. From expression (1), if relative PPP holds at the aggregate
level, the last two terms are zero, and the terms of trade move one-for-one with the PPI-
based RER.12 Instead, in the data, we ﬁnd the terms of trade move by much less than the
P P I - b a s e dR E R .H e n c e ,i tm u s tb et h a ti nt h ed a t at h e r ea r es y s t e m a t i cﬂuctuations in the
price ratios PPI/EPI and IPI/PPI∗.
Likewise, consider the role of deviations from relative PPP in accounting for our second
fact. If relative PPP holds at the aggregate level, then international trade should play an
important role in mitigating the impact of ﬂuctuations in relative producer prices on relative
consumer prices for tradeable goods. This result can be illustrated simply in a two-country
symmetric model with balanced trade that abstracts from nontraded distribution costs for
goods at the retail level. Let [ PPIi denote the change in the logarithm of the producer price
index for manufactured goods in country i (recall that it includes the prices that domestic
ﬁr m sc h a r g ef o re x p o r t sa sw e l la st h ep r i c e st h a td o m e s t i cﬁrms charge for domestic sales).
11In the data, PPI∗ and IPI are trade-weighted averages of producer and import price indices, respec-
tively. So the change in IPI/PPI∗ is a weighted average of the change in the ratio of producer and export
price indices of each trading partner.
12A similar decomposition has been studied in the sticky price literature on the ﬂuctuations in international
relative prices. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) have observed that if one assumes that nominal prices are stuck
in the currency of the producing ﬁrm, then the ratio of nominal export prices to producer prices in each
country is ﬁxed, and hence the terms of trade and the PPI-based RER move together one-for-one with any
movement in the nominal exchange rate. In contrast, if nominal prices are stuck in the currency of the
country in which the good is sold, then a shift in the exchange rate leads to a shift in the ratio of export
prices to domestic prices in each country and the terms of trade moves in the opposite direction as the
PPI-based RER.
10Let [ IPIi and [ EPIi denote the change in the logarithm of the import and export price
indices for manufactured goods in country i. In a two-country model, the export price index
in country 1 corresponds to the import price index in country 2, and vice versa. The change
in the consumer price index for goods in country 1 can be approximated by
(2) \ CPI1 ' [ PPI1 + sM
³
[ IPI1 − \ EPI1
´
,
and that for country 2 by
(3) \ CPI2 ' [ PPI2 + sM
³
\ EPI1 − [ IPI1
´
,
where, with symmetry and balanced trade, sM is the share of consumption expenditure on
imports in both countries. Hence, the change in the CPI-based RER for goods as a fraction
of the change in the PPI-based RER is given by13
(4)
\ CPI1 − \ CPI2
[ PPI1 − [ PPI2
' 1 − 2sM
\ EPI1 − [ IPI1
[ PPI1 − [ PPI2
.
This expression highlights the role of (1) a relatively low value of the import share sM and
(2) aggregate deviations from relative PPP as key elements determining the magnitude in
ﬂuctuations in relative consumer prices of goods as a fraction of ﬂuctuations in relative
producer prices.
We now document that, indeed, there are large aggregate deviations from relative PPP
measured as ﬂuctuations in the price ratios PPI/EPI and IPI/PPI∗ for our set of indus-
trialized countries. Moreover, these changes in the ratio of export to producer prices are
13This expression will still hold in a multicountry model with asymmetric countries as long as: (1) all
countries are under balanced trade in the steady state, and (2) the foreign producer and consumer price
indices are computed using output-weighted (rather than trade-weighted) averages of the trading partners
indices. Our ﬁnding that in the United States the CPI-based RER for goods is roughly as volatile as the
PPI-based RER also holds when RERs are computed using output weights.
11positively correlated with ﬂuctuations in the PPI-based RER. That is, an increase in home
producer prices relative to foreign producer prices is typically associated with an increase in
home producer prices relative to export prices, and an increase in home import prices relative
to foreign producer prices. In columns 2—3 and 6—7 of Table 1 we report the relative standard
deviations and correlations of PPI/EPI and IPI/PPI∗ to the PPI-based RER. These data
show deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate level that are one-third to two-thirds as
large as the ﬂuctuations in the PPI-based RER, and which are strongly positively correlated
with the movements in the PPI-based RER.
In our model, deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate level arise as a result of
the decisions of individual ﬁrms to price-to-market. An implication of our model, then,
is that deviations from relative PPP should hold in more disaggregated data. We now
present evidence of substantial and systematic deviations from relative PPP using more
disaggregated data on prices.
We begin with import prices disaggregated by country of origin. We consider ﬂuctuations
in IPI/PPI∗ for the United States using US manufacturing import price indices for imports
from Japan, the European Union, and Canada, and corresponding source country manufac-
turing producer price indices, all expressed in US dollars. In Table 2, Panel A, we report the
volatility and correlation of these country of origin speciﬁcm e a s u r e so fIPI/PPI∗ relative
to ﬂuctuations in the PPI-based RER between the United States and each of these regions
over the period 1991—2006. Using these data disaggregated by country, we ﬁnd results very
similar to what we found for the United States at the aggregate level.
We now examine data on producer and export prices disaggregated by sector for both
the United States and Japan. Speciﬁcally, we examine the volatility and correlation of
sectoral measures of PPI/EPI relative to the ﬂuctuations in the overall PPI-based RER
for these two countries. In Table 2, Panel B, we summarize the volatility and correlation
of PPI/EPI for 39 US manufacturing four-digit SIC sectors during 1980—1992, relative to
the overall US manufacturing PPI-based RER. Speciﬁcally, we report the median, the mean,
12the maximum, the minimum, and the standard deviation of these statistics across the 39
sectors for which we have data. Likewise, in Table 2, Panel C, we report the volatility and
correlation of Japan’s producer prices relative to export prices (PPI/EPI) for seven major
manufacturing industries, relative to the total manufacturing PPI-based RER in Japan over
the period 1975—2006. In the US data, we ﬁnd that the median and mean volatilities of
PPI/EPI are roughly one-third as large as that of the overall PPI-based RER. This is
similar to what we found for the United States in the aggregate data. There is, however, a
great deal of heterogeneity in this measure across sectors. For the Japanese sectoral data,
the ﬂuctuations in PPI/EPI are larger relative to the overall PPI-based RER than in the
US data, which, again, is consistent with the aggregate data in Table 1.
Finally, we note that several researchers have found substantial deviations from relative
PPP in ﬁrm level or highly disaggregated product level price data. For example, Marston
(1990) studies the response of domestic and export prices to changes in Japan’s real exchange
rate for 17 four-digit Japanese industries. On average, his estimates imply that the relative
price of exports to domestic sales falls by roughly 50 percent of any appreciation of the RER.
Knetter (1989, 1993) studies how prices of exports from the United States, United Kingdom,
Japan, and Germany respond to changes in destination-speciﬁcR E R s . H eﬁnds that the
relative price that Japanese auto exporters charge for their exports to Germany compared
with the price charged to the United States changes by 70 percent of any ﬂu c t u a t i o ni nt h e
Germany-US RER. Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) survey recent micro studies
that suggest that pricing-to-market is prevalent in the data.
II. Model
We develop a model in which two symmetric countries (indexed by i =1 ,2) produce
and trade a continuum of goods subject to frictions in international goods markets. We ﬁrst
present our results in a version of the model that abstracts from distribution costs so as to
isolate the role of trade costs and variable markups in shaping ﬂuctuations in international
relative prices. We then introduce nontradeable distribution costs to address the data on the
13CPI-based RER for goods (which include distribution costs). We consider aggregate shocks
to productivity as the driving force behind ﬂuctuations in international relative prices.
Preferences in country i are given by E0
P∞
t=0 β
tu(cit,1 − lit) ,w h e r eβ is the discount
factor and u(c,1 − l)=l o g
£
cμ (1 − l)
1−μ¤
.H e r ecit denotes ﬁnal consumption and lit denotes
working hours of the representative household of country i at time t. W ea s s u m et h a t
households in each country trade a complete set of international assets. In solving for


















Here, Wit and Pit denote the wage and the ﬁnal consumption price in country i at time t.
As is standard with complete markets, these ﬁrst-order conditions hold at every date and in
every state of nature.
A. Aggregation of Goods into Sectors
Our model is designed to allow us to derive implications for international relative prices
at both an aggregated and a disaggregated level. At the lowest level of aggregation in our
model, we consider individual ﬁrms producing what we term goods.T h e s e g o o d s a r e t h e
only commodities in our model that should be interpreted as physical objects that can be
traded across international borders.
We aggregate goods into categories that we term sectors. We interpret sectors in our
model as corresponding to the lowest level of disaggregation of commodities used in economic
censuses and price index construction. We assume that each ﬁrm in our model produces a
distinct good in a speciﬁc sector. One important assumption that we make is that there are
14only a relatively small number of ﬁrms in each individual sector. We then further aggregate
sectors into a consumption composite, which we call ﬁnal consumption. In what follows,
we describe aggregation of goods into sectors, and sectors into ﬁnal consumption within a
period, and for simplicity we drop the subscript t.
Final consumption, ci, is produced by a competitive ﬁrm using the output of a continuum



























We now turn to the lowest level of aggregation in the model, the aggregation of goods
into sectors. In each country i and sector j, there are K domestic ﬁrms selling distinct goods
a n da na d d i t i o n a lK foreign ﬁrms that may, in equilibrium, sell goods in that sector. We
use the convention that ﬁrms k =1 ,2,...,K a r ed o m e s t i ca n dk = K +1 ,K+2 ,...,2K










where qijk denotes sales in country i of ﬁrm k in sector j. Again, as is standard, the sectoral



















B. Production and International Trade Costs
We assume that each ﬁrm has a constant returns to scale production function that has
labor as the only input. The production functions for ﬁrms from country i are given by
Aizl,w h e r ez diﬀers across ﬁrms and Ai denotes aggregate productivity that aﬀects all ﬁrms
based in country i.E a c h ﬁrm in sector j b a s e di nc o u n t r yi (i.e., those with k ≤ K are
based in country 1) draws its idiosyncratic productivity z from a log-normal distribution,
that is, logz ∼ N(0,θ). This idiosyncratic component of productivity is ﬁxed over time. The
marginal cost of production, exclusive of trade costs, for a ﬁrm with productivity z based in
country i is Wi/(Aiz).
In addition to the production costs, we assume that there are costs of international trade.
International trade is prohibitively costly for ﬁnal consumption. The output of ﬁrms can be
traded, under two types of costs. We assume there is a ﬁxed labor cost F for any ﬁrm that
wishes to export any of its output to the other country. We also assume that there is an
iceberg type marginal cost of exporting denoted by D ≥ 1. With this iceberg trade cost, the
marginal cost for a ﬁrm with productivity z b a s e di nc o u n t r y1 to sell its output in country
2 is DW1/(A1z). Note that with D =1 , the marginal cost of sales for this ﬁrm is the same
across countries.
In the model, we assume that there is an exogenously given number K of domestic ﬁrms
in each sector, each with idiosyncratic productivity draws z. For simplicity, we do not model
16the entry decisions to the domestic market. The total number of ﬁrms, both domestic and
foreign, that sell positive amounts of their goods in each country is determined endogenously
in equilibrium–ﬁrms will choose to export if it is proﬁtable for them to do so.
C. Market Structure
We assume that the individual goods producing ﬁrms are engaged in imperfect compe-
tition. In most of the results that follow, we take as a baseline case a model of imperfect
competition based on the following assumptions.
A1) Goods are imperfect substitutes: ρ<∞.
A2) Goods within a sector are more substitutable than goods across sectors: 1 <η<ρ .
A3) Firms play a static game of quantity competition. Speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm k chooses
its quantity qijk sold in country i taking as given the quantities chosen by the other ﬁrms
in the economy, as well as the domestic wage rate (W1 for ﬁrms with k ≤ K and W2 for
those with k>K ), and the ﬁnal consumption price Pi and quantity ci. Note that under this
assumption, each ﬁrm does recognize that sectoral prices Pij and quantities yij vary when
that ﬁrm changes its quantity qijk.
We solve the model under these assumptions as follows. Suppose that only the K domestic
ﬁr m sp r o d u c ea n ds e l li ne a c hc o u n t r yi ns e c t o rj (below we describe how we solve for the
number of foreign ﬁrms that supply the domestic market in each sector). For concreteness,
consider sector j in country 1. We say that a vector of quantities q1jk and prices P1jk are
equilibrium prices and quantities in that sector if, for each ﬁrm k =1 ,...K,with productivity
zjk (the subindex k reveals the source country of the ﬁrm), the quantity q1jk and price P1jk



















where y1j is given by (10) with q1jk = q and the other quantities q1jl, l 6= k, taken as given.
The ﬁnal consumption price P1 and quantity c1 are also taken as given.
The vector of equilibrium prices for the sector can be found by solving the ﬁrst order con-
ditions of this proﬁt maximization problem given the wage rate W1, aggregate productivity

















and sijk = Pijkqijk/
PK
l=1 Pijlqijl is the market share of ﬁrm k in its sector. From (11) and







Hence, (15) deﬁnes K nonlinear equations in the K equilibrium prices Pijk.
We use an iterative procedure to determine how many foreign ﬁrms pay the ﬁxed trade
cost to supply the domestic market. We take the levels of the wage rate, Wi,a n dt h eﬁnal
consumption price Pi and quantity ci as given (these are determined in general equilibrium,
as described below). We assume that foreign ﬁrms consider entry sequentially in reverse order
of unit costs (this is one among many other potential equilibria). We illustrate this procedure
for sector j in country 1. We ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium prices under the assumption that
only the lowest cost producer in sector j in country 2 exports his good to country 1. In this
18case, we solve for the K prices for the domestic ﬁrms using equation (15) and the one price







Note here that the iceberg trade cost D scales up the marginal cost for this exporter. With
these equilibrium prices, we can use (11) to compute the sectoral price, and then use (9) and
(12) to compute exports q1jK+1 (using the value of P
η
1c1 to compute sectoral output). Then
we check whether, at these prices and quantities, this lowest cost exporter in country 2 earns
enough proﬁts to cover the ﬁxed cost W2F. If this lowest cost exporter does not earn enough
to cover the ﬁxed cost, then, in equilibrium, there are no ﬁrms in sector j that export their
good from country 2 to country 1. If this lowest cost exporter does earn enough to cover the
ﬁxed cost, then we repeat the procedure above under the assumption that the two lowest
cost ﬁrms in sector j in country 2 export to country 1. If, at these new prices, the second
lowest cost ﬁrm in country 2 does not earn a proﬁt large enough to cover the ﬁxed cost W2F,
then, in equilibrium, only the lowest cost ﬁrm in sector j in country 2 exports to country
1. If that second lowest cost producer in country 2 does earn a proﬁt large enough to cover
the ﬁxed cost W2F, we repeat the procedure with the three lowest cost ﬁrms in sector j in
country 2. The outcome of this procedure is a set of equilibrium prices Pijk and a number of
foreign ﬁrms supplying the domestic market in sector j,g i v e nﬁxed aggregate prices, wages,
and quantities (to be determined below).
D. General Equilibrium
In our model, we solve a static problem for the general equilibrium prices and quantities
at every date, simply as a function of the realized aggregate productivity shocks A1 and A2.
This is a problem of ﬁnding a ﬁxed point in the aggregate variables {Pi,W i,c i,l i}
2
i=1,w h e r e





W1 we solve for the number of ﬁrms and prices in every sector in both countries using the
19procedure described above. Aggregate and sectoral prices are then given by (8) and (11).
Quantities produced by each ﬁrm are given by (9) and (12). Aggregate labor demand is
constructed by adding up the implied labor demand of each ﬁrm including the ﬁxed costs of
exporting. We ﬁnd a ﬁxed point when the households’ three ﬁrst order conditions (5) and
(6) are satisﬁed.
E. Discussion
The overall volume of trade in our model is determined by the tension between the gains
from trade due to increased variety and the international trade costs. In our model, with
ρ<∞, the gains from trade are due entirely to increased variety since, by assumption, ﬁrms
in each country produce a distinct set of goods. In the limit as ρ →∞ , the model becomes
Ricardian as the distinction between goods within a sector disappears.
Assumptions A1 and A2 are two of the key features of this model of imperfect compe-
tition that generate variable markups. The assumption A1 that ρ<∞ implies that goods
within a sector are imperfect substitutes so that each ﬁrm in a sector charges a distinct
price for its product despite the fact that ﬁrms are engaged in quantity competition. The
assumption A2 that ρ>ηimplies that each ﬁrm’s markup of its price over marginal cost
is an increasing function of that ﬁrm’s market share within its sector. This implication of
the model is clearly seen in the elasticity formula (16). In one extreme, if the ﬁrm has a
market share s approaching zero, it perceives only the sectoral elasticity of demand ρ and
chooses a markup equal to ρ/(ρ − 1). In the other extreme, if the ﬁrm has a market share
s approaching one, it perceives the lower elasticity of demand across sectors η and sets a
higher markup equal to η/(η−1). Firms with a sectoral market share between zero and one
choose a markup that increases smoothly with that market share.
It is this assumption A2 together with the assumption that there are only K<∞ ﬁrms
in each sector that breaks the link between prices and costs in our model and gives us the
possibility that ﬁrms do not pass-through changes in cost one-for-one into prices. Speciﬁcally,
if a single ﬁrm or a group of ﬁrms in a sector experiences an increase in marginal cost relative
20to the other ﬁrms in the sector, this ﬁrm or group of ﬁrms loses market share and hence
decreases the markup in equilibrium. As a result, the prices charged by this ﬁrm or group
of ﬁrms rise by less than the increase in their costs.14 O fc o u r s e ,i fw eh a v eac o n t i n u u m
of ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o r ,t h e ne a c hﬁrm has an inﬁnitesimal market share and thus charges a
constant markup of ρ/(ρ − 1).
Hence, with our assumptions, the observation of incomplete pass-through of changes in
costs to prices arises quite naturally in our model. However, this feature of our model that
generates incomplete pass-through is not, by itself, enough to generate pricing-to-market.
To get pricing-to-market, we must have that a change in costs for one ﬁrm or a group of
ﬁrms leads to a change in markups for those ﬁrms that is diﬀe r e n ti ne a c hm a r k e ti nw h i c h
these ﬁrms compete. To get some intuition of how this might occur in a particular sector,
imagine that in this sector, country 1 ﬁrms have 100 percent market share in their home
country and 50 percent market share in country 2. We can compute the response of prices
t oas h o c kt h a tr a i s e sW1/A1 relative to W2/A2 as follows. In country 1, ﬁr m si nt h i ss e c t o r
raise their prices for domestic sales by the full amount of the increase in costs because all
ﬁrms in these sectors experience the same cost shock and hence their market shares remain
unchanged. In contrast, ﬁrms in country 1 raise their export prices by less than the full cost
shock because they lose market share to the ﬁrms in this sector in country 2. Hence, ﬁrms
in country 1 raise their export price by less than their domestic price in response to a cost
shock.
It is worth noting that if we make the alternative assumption that ρ = η, then our model
reduces to the standard model of monopolistic competition with a constant markup of price
over marginal cost given by ρ/(ρ − 1). We present results from this model with constant
markups to illustrate the quantitative importance of endogenous variation in markups in
our model. This model with ρ = η and hence constant markups is related to the model
studied by Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas
14Note that if costs rise by the same amount for all ﬁrms in a sector, then prices also all rise by that
amount, and market shares and markups remain constant.
21(2007) study similar models in which it is assumed that ﬁrms set prices equal to marginal cost.
Our model has similar implications for the movements in international relative prices under
the assumption that ρ = η, so that markups are constant, as it does under the assumption
that ﬁrms set prices equal to marginal cost.
With the assumption A3 that ﬁrms engage in quantity competition, our model nests the
standard Cournot model as ρ gets large. This is because, as ρ approaches inﬁnity, the distinct
goods in a sector become perfect substitutes and there is a single price in each country for
output in that sector. This Cournot model is similar to that studied in Eaton, Kortum, and
Kramarz (2004).
In this paper, we study pricing under the assumption of quantity competition. It is
straightforward to solve our model under the alternative assumption that ﬁrms engage in
price competition in the sense that they choose their price and quantity to maximize proﬁts,
taking the vector of prices (rather than quantities) chosen by the other ﬁr m sa sg i v e n .U n d e r
this alternative assumption of price competition, in equilibrium ﬁrms choose a markup of
price over marginal cost as in (15), where the elasticity of demand is now given by
(19) ε(s)=ρ(1 − s)+ηs ,
where s is the ﬁrm’s market share within the sector. Note that with ρ>η ,the elasticity
(markup) is a decreasing (increasing) function of the ﬁrm’s market share s. Thus, the impli-
cations of our model for markups under price competition are qualitatively similar to those
under quantity competition.
If we set ρ = ∞, F =0 ,a n da s s u m et h a tﬁrms engage in price competition, then
our model is similar to the Bertrand model studied in Bernard et al. (2003). For this
Bertrand model, we can derive simple conditions for pricing-to-market to occur in equilibrium
(see Atkeson and Burstein 2007). We choose to study quantity competition rather than
price competition in part because our model is not continuous in its parameters under price
22competition. In particular, the equilibrium predictions of the model with large ρ and F =0
are not similar to those of the Bertrand version of the model with ρ = ∞ and F =0 . Hence,
the simple intuition for pricing-to-market in the Bertrand version of the model with ρ = ∞
is very special and does not carry over to price competition more generally with ρ<∞.
Note that in our model, if the ﬁxed cost of exporting F is equal to zero, then deviations
from the law of one price are limited by iceberg costs according to: 1/D ≥ P1jk/P2jk ≤
D. This is because markups in the export market are never larger than in the domestic
market (this result relies on the assumption that η and ρ are the same in the two countries).
Since equilibrium price diﬀerentials are lower than the cost of trading goods internationally,
no third party has an incentive to ship goods to arbitrage these price diﬀerentials across
countries. Therefore, in this case, the fact that consumers do not have incentives to arbitrage
price diﬀerentials across countries is an outcome of the model, and not a consequence of
assuming international market segmentation. Under the assumption that the ﬁxed cost of
exporting is positive, it is theoretically possible that international price diﬀerentials may
exceed the marginal cost of shipping goods internationally. This does not occur in any of
our quantitative examples.
III. Quantitative Example
Here we argue that a plausibly parameterized version of our model can reproduce the two
main facts regarding international relative prices cited above. Speciﬁcally, we show that, in
response to an exogenous shock to aggregate productivity across countries, this model implies
(i) a movement in the terms of trade that is much smaller than the movement in the PPI-
based RER, and (ii) a movement in the CPI-based RER that is quite large relative to the
PPI-based RER.
A. Choosing Benchmark Parameters
Our model on the production side has six parameters: K, η, ρ, θ, D, and F. In addition,
there are two parameters in the household’s utility function (β and μ), which we set to
23the standard values (β =0 .96 and μ =2 /3). We now describe how we set the value of the
production parameters.
We choose K =2 0 . In our numerical simulations, we simulate prices and quantities for
400,000 ﬁrms in each country, which corresponds to 20,000 sectors. Since there are roughly
10,000 10-digit NAICS sectors, we interpret the sectors in the model as corresponding to a
breakdown more disaggregated than 10-digit NAICS sectors. In Section V, we explore how
our results vary with diﬀerent values of K.
We choose η close to 1 to keep sectoral expenditure shares roughly constant, and we set
ρ =1 0 .W i t h ρ =1 0 , import demand at the sectoral level in our model is quite elastic.
James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop (2004) survey the evidence on the elasticity of
demand for imports at the sectoral level and conclude that this elasticity is likely to be in
the range of 5 to 10. Our model, with ρ =1 0 , is at the high end of this range.
We choose the three remaining parameters on the production side of the model (θ, D,
and F) to match, in a symmetric equilibrium with A1 = A2, observations in the US economy
on the overall volume of trade, the fraction of ﬁrms that export, and a measure of indus-
try concentration at the sectoral level. In particular, we target three statistics. The ﬁrst
is the average of exports and imports relative to gross output in goods producing sectors
in US data in the period 1997—2003, equal to 16.5 percent.15 The second is the fraction
of US manufacturing plants that export any output at all during the period 1987—1992,
equal to 25 percent.16 The third is the median Herﬁndahl index across sectors, which we
set equal to 1500.17 Although we do not have comprehensive data with which to compare
these implications of our model for market concentration across sectors,18 it is useful to note
15Using data from Source OECD, the average of US manufactured imports and exports as a ratio of
manufactured gross output increased from 11.7 percent in 1987 to 21 percent in 2003. We choose to target
the average ratio in this period, roughly equal to 16.5 percent.
16As reported in Table 1 in Bernard and Jensen (2004), the fraction of exporters in total plants was 21
percent in 1987 and 30 percent in 1992. We choose an intermediate value of 25 percent.
17The Herﬁndahl index for a sector is the sum of the squared market shares of the ﬁrms in that sector,
multiplied by 10,000.
18The Census Bureau computes Herﬁndahl indices for manufacturing sectors down to six-digit NAICS
industries using data from the Census of Manufactures. In 1997, there were 473 six-digit NAICS industries
with 282 ﬁrms in the median industry and 700 ﬁrms on average in each industry. The median Herﬁndahl
24for comparison purposes that the US Department of Justice, in its merger guidelines, re-
gards markets with a Herﬁndahl index below 1000 to be “unconcentrated,” markets with a
Herﬁndahl index between 1000 and 1800 as “moderately concentrated,” and markets with a
Herﬁndahl index above 1800 to be “highly concentrated.”19 We regard these merger guide-
lines as a rough guide to the level of concentration of markets at an economically meaningful
level of sectoral aggregation in the US economy. We have chosen the number 1500 so that
our median sector is moderately concentrated. Our model’s implications for these facts in
a symmetric equilibrium are invariant to the choice of parameters in the household’s utility
function (β and μ). The values of the production parameters and the corresponding facts in
t h eU Sd a t aa r el i s t e di nT a b l e3 . 20 In Section V, we discuss the sensitivity of our results to
the parameters K, η, ρ, and the median Herﬁndahl index.
The production parameters θ, D,a n dF are related to these facts as follows. In our
model, if F =0and ρ<∞, all ﬁrms export some of their output. Thus, a positive ﬁxed
cost of exporting is required to match the observation that only a minority of plants export.
Holding ﬁxed the other parameters and the identity of those ﬁrms that do export, variations
in the marginal trade cost D change the fraction of output that an exporting ﬁrm exports
and hence the overall volume of trade. The parameters θ and K govern the dispersion of
productivities across ﬁrms, while the parameters η and ρ govern the extent to which this
dispersion in productivities results in a dispersion of market shares across ﬁrms.
As a further check on our benchmark parameterization, we compare some additional
implications of our model with US data.
O u rm a c r oo b s e r v a t i o no nt h eo v e r a l lv o l u m eo ft r a d ec a nb eb r o k e nd o w n ,a tt h eﬁrm
level, into two components: (i) the fraction of ﬁrms that export any output at all, and (ii)
index across these industries was 571, and the average of the Herﬁndahl indices across these industries was
737. We interpret sectors in our model as being at a lower level of aggregation than these six-digit industries
and thus expect a higher level of concentration on average within our sectors.
19See, in particular, the discussion at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/15.html.
20The value of D we use in our quantitative example is consistent with evidence on trade costs surveyed
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Instead of reporting F, we report in Table 3 the fraction of the labor
force employed in ﬁxed export costs activities.
25t h ef r a c t i o no ft o t a lo u t p u tt h a te x p o r t i n gﬁrms actually export. In Table 3, we compare
our model’s implications for the fraction of total output that exporting ﬁrms actually export
with data from Bernard et al. (2003) on the median fraction of total plant output that US
exporting plants export. Here our model appears to be roughly in line with these data.
In our model with trade costs, it is the ﬁrms that draw the lowest marginal costs of
production that choose to pay the costs to export. In equilibrium, these ﬁrms also tend to
charge lower prices in their home market, and thus to sell more output and to have a higher
market share in their home sector, than the ﬁrms that do not export. Since these exporting
ﬁrms tend to have a higher market share in their home sector, from (15), we see that in the
model, exporters tend to choose a higher markup of price over marginal cost. As Bernard et
al. (2003) discuss in detail, this implication that exporters choose a higher markup of price
over marginal cost implies that exporters have higher labor productivity measured as sales
divided by employment than non-exporters. In Table 3, we present the model’s implications
for the median sales and measured labor productivity of ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tv e r s u st h em e d i a n
sales and measured labor productivity of ﬁrms that do not export.21 We compare these
implications of the model to US data cited in Bernard et al. (2003) regarding the median
sales and measured labor productivity of US manufacturing plants that export versus the
median sales and measured labor productivity of US manufacturing plants that do not export
and to similar statistics for French ﬁrms reported in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004).
These authors examine census data on the export behavior of French ﬁrms and observe that
t h e s eF r e n c hd a t ad on o tc e n s o ro u ts m a l lﬁrms in the same way that the US data from
the Census of Manufactures does. They ﬁnd that median sales for exporters in these French
data are 28 times the median sales for non-exporters. This is much larger than the analogous
ﬁgure of 4.8 from the US data cited in Bernard et al. (2003). These statistics from our model
lie between those from the US and French data.
In Table 3, we also report the sales-weighted mean markup of price over marginal cost
21We assume that the ﬁxed costs of exporting are not counted in the calculation of labor productivity.
26across ﬁrms in our model. The average markup in our model is in line with average markups
assumed in standard macro models (see, for example, Lawrence J. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Charles L. Evans 2005). In Figure 2, we show a histogram of Herﬁndahl indices across
sectors in our model and a histogram of markups across ﬁrms.
B. Two Alternative Parameter Settings
We also study the implications of our model with two alternative sets of parameter values
to illustrate the key economic forces at play in our benchmark example. These alternative
parameter choices, together with the model implications for these parameter choices, are
also presented in Table 3.
In our ﬁr s ta l t e r n a t i v es e to fp a r a m e t e r s ,w es e tρ = η. From (15), we see that in this
case, all ﬁrms choose a constant markup of price over marginal cost of ρ/(ρ − 1). We refer
to this parameterization of our model as the constant markup v e r s i o no fo u rm o d e l . T h e
parameters F and D are chosen so that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the constant markup
version of our model has the same implications for the share of exports in manufacturing
output and the fraction of exporting ﬁr m sa st h eb e n c h m a r km o d e l .T h ev a l u eo fρ = η =3
is roughly equal to the value used by Bernard et al. (2003). The parameters K and θ are
unchanged. We consider this constant markup version of our model to illustrate the role that
variable markups play in shaping our model’s implications for international relative prices.
In the second alternative set of parameters, we set D =1and F =0 . In this case, there
are no costs of international trade. We leave the other parameters unchanged. We refer
to this parameterization of our model as the frictionless trade version of our model. We
consider this frictionless trade version of our model to illustrate the role that trade frictions
play in shaping our model’s implications for international relative prices.
C .T h eR e s p o n s eo fA g g r e g a t eP r i c e st oaC h a n g ei nC o s t s
We now consider the change in equilibrium international relative prices implied by a fall
in aggregate productivity in country 1 (A1)s u ﬃcient to generate a 1 percent increase in
27aggregate costs W1/A1 in country 1 relative to aggregate costs W2/A2 in country 2.N o t e
that with our choice of numeraire, W2 =1 , costs in country 2 do not change.
With each ﬁrm charging a distinct price, we construct in the model distinct sectoral
producer price indices (following the practice of the BLS, covering prices that domestic
producers charge for all sales including sales to foreigners), import price indices (covering
prices that foreign ﬁrms charge for domestic sales), export price indices (covering prices
that domestic ﬁrms charge for foreign sales), and consumer price indices (covering prices
of domestically consumed goods, including domestically produced and imported goods). In
each case, we construct price indices from the model using sales (or expenditure) weighted
averages of price changes for each good. In the case of the export and import price indices,
for goods that switch export or import status as a result of the shock, we attribute a price
change equal to the overall change in the index. This procedure is equivalent to omitting
these goods from the index and renormalizing the weights for the remaining goods.22 In the
Appendix, we deﬁne the aggregate price indices that we compute in our model.
In Table 4 we report on our benchmark model’s implications for the relative price move-
ments that are the focus of our study: (i) the movement in the terms of trade, and (ii) the
movement in the CPI-based RER, both as a percentage of the movement in PPI-based RER.
We also include in the table the implications of the constant markup and the frictionless trade
versions of our model for these same relative price movements.
Terms of Trade.–In row 1 of Table 4, we see that our benchmark model produces a
movement in the terms of trade for country 1 that is only 53 percent as large as the movement
in the PPI-based RER. In this regard, we see that our benchmark model reproduces our ﬁrst
fact–the terms of trade are signiﬁcantly less volatile than the PPI-based RER. In our model,
as in the data, this arises as a result of large deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate
level. In column 1, rows 4—7 of Table 4, we report the movements in the producer price
22This is the procedure followed by the BLS in the construction of export and import price in-
dices for the United States. See also the draft chapters of the IMF’s Export and Import Price In-
dex Manual for a detailed discussion of the construction of these price indices. These are available at
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/tegeipi.
28index, the export price index, and the import price index for countries 1 and 2 in response
to the 1 percent increase in country 1’s aggregate marginal costs W1/A1. T h e r ew es e et h a t
producer prices in country 1 rise by more than export prices. Note in rows 6 and 7 that the
producer price index in country 2 and the import price index in country 1 also rise, with
the latter rising more than the former. This is true despite the fact that there has been
no change in costs in country 2. Thus, our model generates a positive correlation in the
movements in PPI1/EPI1 and IPI1/PPI2 with PPI1/PPI2,a si nt h ed a t a . I nS e c t i o n
IV, we show how these deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate level result from the
decisions of individual ﬁrms to price-to-market.
Looking at the entries in Table 4 for the corresponding price movements for our constant
markup and frictionless trade versions of the model, we see that we need both variable
markups and trade frictions to deliver these implications for the terms of trade and PPI-
based RER. In both of these alternative versions of our model, the movement in the terms
of trade is identical to the movement in the PPI-based RER, and the ratio of export prices
to producer prices is constant in both countries because relative PPP holds.
The logic behind this ﬁnding that the terms of trade move one-for-one with the relative
producer prices diﬀers across the constant markup and frictionless trade versions of our
model. In the constant markup version of our model, the logic for this result is quite simple:
for each ﬁrm, both domestic and export prices move one-for-one with the movement in
domestic costs. Hence, relative PPP holds good by good. Note that since all prices charged
by country 1 ﬁrms change by the same amount, and the change in the export price index is a
weighted average of individual exporters’ price changes, changes in ﬁrms’ export participation
have no impact in the change in the export price index. Thus, relative PPP holds in the
aggregate as well. This feature of this constant markup model can be seen clearly in column
2, rows 4—7 of Table 4.
For the frictionless trade version of the model, the logic for this result is more subtle.
In this version of the model, markups are not constant–they vary with market share as
29described in (15). Thus, it is not the case that changes in cost are passed on fully to
p r i c e s . I nf a c t ,a si ss h o w ni nc o l u m n2 ,r o w s4a n d5o ft h et a b l e ,t h e r ei si n c o m p l e t e
pass-through as the ﬁrms in the country with rising wages lose market share and hence
reduce their markups at home and abroad, while we see in rows 6 and 7 that the ﬁrms
in country 2 with the constant costs increase their prices for domestic sales and exports.
With no trade frictions, however, the set of ﬁrms and their costs competing in each sector
is the same across countries, and this leads to relative PPP for each good despite imperfect
competition. More speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm in a sector has the same cost for sales in each
country, and hence each ﬁrm has identical market shares, identical markups, and identical
prices in each country. This implies that, for each country, export prices remain constant
relative to domestic producer prices, and thus, from our decomposition (1), changes in the
terms of trade are identical to changes in the PPI-based RER. Hence, one can say that
in the frictionless trade version of the model, there is incomplete pass-through of costs to
prices, but no pricing-to-market. International trade costs are not necessary for incomplete
pass-through, but they are necessary for pricing-to-market.
Note that our ﬁnding that aggregate relative PPP holds in the constant markup and
frictionless examples is a theoretical result that does not depend on the value of the other
parameters.
CPI-Based RER.–We now turn to our model’s implications for movements in the relative
price of goods across countries when these prices are measured with consumer prices rather
than producer prices. In column 1, row 8 of Table 4, we see that our benchmark model
produces a movement in the CPI-based RER across countries that is 82 percent as large as
the movement in the PPI-based RER.
This ﬁnding in our benchmark model that the movement in the relative consumer price
across countries is quite large stands in stark contrast to the implications of the frictionless
trade version of our model. As shown in column 3, row 8 of Table 4, in the frictionless trade
version of our model, the CPI-based RER does not move at all. This is because, in the
30frictionless trade version of the model, relative PPP holds for each good and consumption
baskets are identical across countries. Hence, the consumer price index is identical across
countries. In this sense, the introduction of costs of international trade has a dramatic impact
on the pricing implications of our model and moves the model much closer to the data not
only in terms of its implications for traded quantities but also in terms of its implications
for the CPI-based RER.
Now consider the implications of our constant markup version of the model for movements
i nt h eC P I - b a s e dR E R .I nc o l u m n2 ,r o w8o fT a b l e4 ,w es e et h a tt h em o v e m e n ti nt h e
CPI-based RER is 67 percent of the movement in the PPI-based RER.
We can now use expression (4) to understand the results obtained in row 8, Table 4. Under
frictionless trade, the import share is sM =1 /2 and relative PPP holds at the aggregate level.
Hence, movements in the CPI-based RER are as large as those of the PPI-based RER.
Consider now the constant markup version of our model. In that model, all goods prices
move one-for-one with movements in marginal costs. Thus, relative PPP holds and both the
terms of trade for country 1 and the PPI-based RER move by the change in relative costs.
T h er a t i oo ft h ep e r c e n t a g em o v e m e n ti nt h eC P I - b a s e dR E Rr e l a t i v et ot h eP P I - b a s e dR E R
is 67 percent, which follows from expression (4) and sM =0 .165.
Now consider our benchmark model with variable markups. We have that there is pricing-
to-market, which leads to a movement in the terms of trade in country 1 that is only 53
percent as large as the movement in the PPI-based RER. Using expression (4) with sM =
0.165, the ratio of the movement in the CPI-based RER to that in the PPI-based RER is
now 83 percent.
Our ﬁnding in the benchmark model that movements in the CPI-based RER are 83
percent as large as movements in the PPI-based RER is an improvement over the models with
constant markups or frictionless trade, but still falls short of matching the US data. Recall
from Figure 1 that movements in the CPI-based RER have roughly the same magnitudes
as movements in the PPI-based RER. We now extend the model to include nontradeable
31distribution costs as a component of consumer prices to examine the performance of our
model when these costs are included.
D. Adding Distribution Costs
There is an extensive literature on the role of nontradeable distribution costs in account-
ing for the behavior of international relative prices. In extending our model, we follow
Burstein, João C. Neves, and Rebelo (2003) in assuming that ﬁnal consumption requires
adding distribution services in the form of nontradeable goods. Here we model these distri-















where dij is the labor input required for distribution in sector j in country i and φ is the weight
of distribution services in this production technology. Here we assumed that distribution
costs account for a constant share of retail prices for each individual good. Under this
assumption, pricing-to-market is unchanged relative to our benchmark model.23
We choose φ =0 .5 based on the gap between total goods consumption at purchaser prices
(from US NIPA), and goods production attributed to consumption, at producer prices, as
reported in the US Input-Output tables. This gap is roughly 55 percent between 1997
and 2002. It mostly reﬂects the presence of wholesale and retail trade, a small fraction
of transportation costs, and restaurant meals, which are counted as goods in the NIPA’s
personal consumption expenditure accounts, and as services in the Input-Output tables.
This choice is also consistent with the shares reported by Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo
(2003).
23Alternatively, we could assume that the manufactured good and distribution services are combined in
ﬁxed proportions. Under this assumption, pricing-to-market is magniﬁed relative to our benchmark model.
Corsetti and Dedola (2005) discuss in detail the implications on pricing-to-market under additive distribution
costs at the individual good level.
32This extended benchmark model generates changes in the CPI-based RER that are 111
percent as large as changes in the PPI-based RER, similar to what is found in the data.
Distribution costs have two eﬀects on the CPI-based RER relative to the PPI-based RER.
First, they reduce the eﬀective share of imported goods in consumption, and this ampliﬁes
changes in relative consumer prices. Second, because distribution is a nontraded component,
ﬂuctuations in the relative price of distribution across countries are larger than ﬂuctuations
in the PPI-based RER when there is incomplete pass-through of costs to prices, and this
also ampliﬁes changes in the CPI-based RER relative to the PPI-based RER.
Note that in our benchmark model, we chose an import share sM =0 .165 to match
the share of trade in manufacturing gross output. We did so to focus on the extent of
international competition in US manufacturing and its impact on the pricing decision of
ﬁrms. One might alternatively choose an import share that reﬂects the importance of direct
imports in consumption. To do so, we recompute our results with an import share equal
to sM =0 .225. This higher import share corresponds to the share of direct imports in
consumption of goods (exclusive of retail and wholesale services) calculated from the 1997 US
Input/Output accounts. We ﬁnd that movements in the terms of trade relative to the PPI-
based RER are slightly larger than in our benchmark model (59 percent), and movements
in the CPI-based RER inclusive of distribution are still large relative to the PPI-based RER
(114 percent).
IV. Firm Level Pricing-to-Market
In our model, deviations from relative PPP at the aggregate level arise as a result of
the decisions of individual ﬁrms to price-to-market. In this section, we present results from
our model on the pricing decisions of individual ﬁrms and the role that heterogeneity across
ﬁrms plays in producing our results.
In our model, each ﬁrm’s market share and pricing decision depends on the exact con-
ﬁguration of costs across ﬁrms in that ﬁrm’s sector. We ﬁnd that the heterogeneity of
productivities across ﬁrms generates a great deal of heterogeneity in pricing. In Figure 3, we
33show the extent of pricing-to-market by each ﬁrm that exports from country 1 to country
2 as a function of that ﬁrm’s market share in country 2. Speciﬁcally, on the vertical axis,
we plot the change in the logarithm of the ratio of each ﬁrm’s domestic price (P1jk)t oi t s
export price (P2jk) divided by the change in the overall PPI-based RER in response to the
1 percent increase in aggregate costs in country 1. Here, a value of zero in the vertical axis
indicates that the ﬁrm changes its domestic and export price by the same amount. Likewise,
a positive value indicates that the ﬁrm raises its domestic price by more than its export price
in response to the aggregate cost shock.
The ﬁgure reveals that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in pricing-to-market at the
ﬁrm level, even if one holds ﬁxed the exporting ﬁrms’ market share. Note in the ﬁgure that
there are a great many ﬁrms with small market shares for whom the change in domestic
prices relative to export prices is negative or zero, while for the ﬁrms with large market
shares, this change in domestic prices relative to export prices is positive. Also note that in
our model, the aggregate producer price index rises relative to the export price index. This
is because these indices compute expenditure share—weighted averages of these price changes
so that the large ﬁrms dominate the index. These relative movements in aggregate prices are
consistent with the aggregate data discussed in Section I, indicating that an increase in home
producer prices relative to foreign producer prices is typically associated with an increase in
home producer prices relative to export prices. Thus, Figure 3 demonstrates that our ﬁnding
that our model can generate movements in aggregate price indices similar to those found in
the data is accounted for by the pricing behavior of large ﬁrms in the model.
Recall that in Table 2 we saw that there was a great deal of variation in the US and
Japanese data on the extent of deviations from relative PPP at the sectoral level. In our
model, there is also a great deal of heterogeneity across sectors in the extent of deviations
from relative PPP. We measure deviations from relative PPP at the sector level in our model
as the change in the producer price index relative to the export price index for individual
sectors as a percentage of the change in the overall PPI-based RER. We summarize the large
34variation in deviations of relative PPP at the sector level as follows. The median, mean,
maximum, minimum, and standard deviation across all sectors are equal to 16, 14, 58, −38,
and 16 percent, respectively. This variation in pricing across sectors arises entirely as the
result of the variation of the conﬁguration of cost realizations for the 40 potentially active
ﬁrms in each sector. Clearly, even abstracting from other diﬀerences across sectors (such as
demand elasticities and trade costs), our model generates a great deal of heterogeneity in
the extent of deviations from relative PPP at the sectoral level.
The results presented in Figure 3 raise three questions. First, what is the role of hetero-
geneity in productivities across ﬁrms in generating our aggregate results? Second, why do
large and small ﬁrms price diﬀerently? And third, what is the role of the extensive margin
in exports in generating our aggregate results?
To begin, we examine pricing decisions of ﬁrms within a sector. For notational conve-
nience, we omit subscript j. The price and market share of ﬁrm k in country i are given by
Pik =
ε(sik)





,w h e r eε(s) is given by (16), Pi is the sectoral price
in country i,a n dwik is the marginal cost of ﬁrm k to sell in country i. This marginal cost
includes the idiosyncratic and aggregate productivities, the aggregate wage, and the variable
trade costs for exports. Log-linearizing:
(21) ˆ Pik = Γ(sik)ˆ sik +ˆ wik
(22) ˆ sik =( 1− ρ)
³
ˆ Pik − ˆ Pi
´
We refer to Γ(s) as the elasticity of the markup with respect to market share. Hence, the
change in the markup is equal to the product of this elasticity and the change in the market













35Note that Γ(s) is an increasing and convex function of s. In the constant markup model,
Γ(s)=0 . For a ﬁr mb a s e di nc o u n t r y1 (k ≤ K), using the fact that the change in marginal
cost is equal for sales to all destinations, the change in the ratio between the export and
domestic price is given by
(24) ˆ P1k − ˆ P2k = Γ(s1k)ˆ s1k − Γ(s2k)ˆ s2k.
As this equation makes clear, there is pricing-to-market when the change in the markup in
export prices diﬀers from the change in the markup in domestic prices. Since the change
in the markup in each market is the product of the elasticity of the markup with respect
to market share and the change in market shares, this pricing-to-market arises when the
elasticity of the markup varies with the ﬁrm’s market share and the ﬁrm has diﬀerent market
shares at home and abroad, and/or when these home and export shares respond diﬀerently
to a shock to aggregate costs.
A. Heterogeneity in Productivities
We use these equations to show that in the absence of heterogeneity across ﬁrms in
productivities and export participation, our model does not produce deviations from relative
PPP in the direction suggested by the data. To see this, consider a version of our model in
which all ﬁrms within a sector have identical cost (i.e., zjk = z for all j,k)a n da l lt h e s eﬁrms
participate in the export market (i.e., F is small enough). We now show analytically that if
D>1 so that the import share is less than one-half, then deviations from relative PPP are in
the wrong direction in the sense that they imply a negative comovement of PPI1/EPI1 and
the PPI-based RER. This happens because country 1 ﬁrms raise export prices relative to the
domestic prices after an increase in their costs relative to costs in country 2. When all ﬁrms
are identical and D>1, all K domestic ﬁrms in country 1 have share s11 and all K foreign
ﬁrms have share s1K+1,w i t hs11 >s 1K+1. Note that Ks11 =1− sM and Ks1K+1 = sM.
Suppose that c W1
A1 = −c W2
A2 =0 .5 percent, which implies that country 1’s relative costs increase
36by 1 percent. By symmetry, changes in prices and shares of foreign ﬁrm sales in one country
are equal to the negative of changes in prices and shares of home ﬁrms in the other country
(e.g., ˆ P11 = − ˆ P2K+1 and ˆ s11 = −ˆ s2K+1). Using the fact that (1 − sM)ˆ s11 + sMˆ s1K+1 =0
(because market shares add up to 1 at all times), we have that ˆ P21 ≤ ˆ P11 in response to
an increase in costs in country 1,i fa n do n l yi f(1 − sM)Γ(s1K+1) >s MΓ(s11).U s i n g t h e
deﬁnition of Γ(.) in (23), this condition is never satisﬁed when s11 >s 1K+1. Hence, without
ﬁrm heterogeneity, all ﬁrms in country 1 increase their export price relative to their domestic
price after an increase in their cost of production. This is at odds with the direction of the
deviations from relative PPP seen in the aggregate price data.24
B. Pricing by Large and Small Firms
We now turn to the question of why large and small ﬁrms choose diﬀerent prices in
response to an aggregate cost shock. In particular, to understand this result that only large
ﬁrms price-to-market in the right direction, it is useful to examine once again the ﬁrm’s
pricing equations. Substituting (22) into (21):




ˆ wik + Γ(sik)(ρ − 1) ˆ Pi
´
.
In this expression, we see that the change in a ﬁrm’s price can be broken into two components:
the change in its price for a given change in its cost, and the change in its price for a given
change in its competitors’ prices as reﬂe c t e di nt h es e c t o r a lp r i c e ˆ Pi. We are interested in
the diﬀerence in the price change across countries, which can be written as















ˆ P1 − ˆ P2
´
24Ravn (2001) also assumes a nested CES demand structure, but abstracts from within sector cost dis-
persion and diﬀerences in the number of domestic and foreign ﬁrms. As we have shown here, this results in
pricing-to-market in the opposite direction than what is suggested by aggregate price data.
37Under incomplete pass-through of cost changes to prices, ˆ w1 ≥ ˆ P1.S o ,g i v e nt h a tΓ(.) is
increasing, with s2k <s 1K, the ﬁrst term is negative. The second term is positive if ˆ P1 > ˆ P2
(which is typically the case with a shock that raises aggregate costs in country 1 relative to
country 2), and it becomes more positive as we increase s.
The ﬁrst term in (26) is the direct eﬀect of a change in the ﬁrm’s costs on its pricing. The
force of this eﬀect in our model is in the wrong direction–through this eﬀect a cost shock
to a home ﬁrm leads it to raise its export price relative to its domestic price. The intuition
for this is that since its home market share tends to be larger than its foreign market share,
the elasticity of its home markup tends to be larger than the elasticity of its foreign markup,
and this leads to more markup adjustment at home than abroad.
The second term in (26) is the eﬀect coming from strategic interactions between ﬁrms–
how the ﬁrm responds to the fact that everyone else is changing their prices. In the standard
constant elasticity model, Γ(s)=0and this eﬀect is not present. Here, with Γ > 0, we have
t h es t a n d a r dl o g i ct h a tm o s tp e o p l eh a v ei nm i n dw h e nt h e yt h i n ka b o u tp r i c i n g - t o - m a r k e t
in general equilibrium: in response to a shock that leads to a decrease in the foreign sectoral
price level relative to the domestic sectoral price level, an individual ﬁr mi nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y
wants to cut its markup abroad relative to its markup at home. This eﬀect is strong enough
to win out only for those ﬁrms with large enough market shares.
We have evaluated the two terms in (26) numerically to understand the dispersion in
pricing-to-market behavior, holding ﬁxed export shares, observed in Figure 3. Our numerical
results indicate that for ﬁrms with small export shares, the dispersion in pricing-to-market
arises mainly as a result of dispersion in domestic versus export market shares (s1k and s2k)
in the ﬁrst term in (26). For ﬁrms with large export shares, this dispersion in pricing-to-
market arises primarily from dispersion in sectoral price indices across countries ( ˆ P1 and ˆ P2)
in the second term in (26).
C. The Extensive Margin
Note that in our analytical argument that a model with no heterogeneity across ﬁrms
38has ﬁrms pricing-to-market in the wrong direction, we assumed that all ﬁrms exported. We
now present an example motivated by Dornbusch (1987) in which all ﬁrms have identical
costs (i.e., zjk = z for all j,k), but the ﬁxed cost of exporting F is chosen so that only a
minority of ﬁrms export. We show in this example that it is possible to generate pricing-
to-market in the right direction in this setting with heterogeneity across ﬁrms only in terms
of export participation. In our example, we assume that the marginal trade cost D =1 ,s o
that for all ﬁrms that export s1k = s2k. Using equation (24) and the arguments above that
the absolute value of ˆ s2k is larger than that of ˆ s1k for all exporting ﬁrms in country 1,t h i s
gives the result that exporting ﬁrms price-to-market in the right direction.25 Hence, in our
model, it is suﬃcient to have heterogeneity across ﬁrms only in terms of export participation
to generate aggregate deviations from relative PPP in the right direction. Of course, this
example fails to match several important features of market structure. In particular in this
example, exporters have a very high export intensity, they have no size or productivity
advantage over non-exporters in terms of domestic sales, and the lack of within-sector cost
heterogeneity implies a very low value of the Herﬁndahl index.
More interesting is the question of whether matching heterogeneity across ﬁrms in their
export participation is critical quantitatively for the results in our benchmark model. Con-
sider now a version of our model in which we set F =0a n d ,a tt h es a m et i m e ,r a i s et h e
marginal export cost D from its benchmark value so as to match again the volume of trade
equal to 16.5 percent of production (results are in column 2 of Table 5). Now, all the ﬁrms
in our model export, and trade is less than the frictionless value of 50 percent only because
of the marginal cost of exporting D. Note that with this change in parameters, the median
Herﬁndahl index in our model is essentially unchanged. We ﬁnd that this parameterization
of our model with the ﬁxed cost equal to zero gives similar implications for changes in prices
a so u rb e n c h m a r km o d e l .T h et e r m so ft r a d em o v eo n l ys l i g h t l ym o r er e l a t i v et ot h eP P I -
based RER than in the benchmark (56 versus 53 percent). The movement in CPI-based
25One can also get this result using equation (26). Since s1k = s2k,t h eﬁrst term in (26) is zero, and ﬁrms
price-to-market in the right direction since ˆ P1 > ˆ P2.
39RER relative to the PPI-based RER is essentially the same as in the benchmark model.
This ﬁnding arises because the typical non-exporter in our benchmark model with positive
ﬁxed costs is so small and because, in response to a shock of only 1 percent to relative costs
in country 1 versus country 2, only a few ﬁrms switch export status (country 1 ﬁrms that
stop exporting and the country 2 ﬁrms that start exporting account for only 0.2 percent of
exports in their respective countries in the symmetric equilibrium).
The extensive margin in export participation becomes more important when the aggre-
gate productivity shock generates a larger movement in relative costs of production across
countries. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we show the response of prices in our benchmark
model to a shock to aggregate productivity in country 1 large enough to generate a move-
ment in relative costs across countries of 10 percent and 50 percent, respectively. In response
to these larger shocks, many more ﬁrms switch export status. In the case of the 10 percent
shock to relative costs, the country 1 ﬁrms that stop exporting and the country 2 ﬁrms that
start exporting account for nearly 3 percent of exports in their respective countries, whereas
i nt h ec a s eo ft h e50 percent shock to relative costs, these ﬁrms account for roughly 40 per-
cent of exports in their respective countries. We see in Table 5 that the results for prices
in our benchmark model do not vary that much with the size of the shock. Speciﬁcally, the
changes in both the terms of trade and the CPI-based RER relative to the change in the
PPI-based RER are similar for all three shocks. There are two oﬀsetting eﬀects as the shock
gets larger. For the ﬁrms in country 1 that continue to export following the shock, they
choose less pricing-to-market as the shock gets larger because they are losing more market
share. On the other hand, the country 1 ﬁrms that stop exporting to country 2 are the
ﬁrms that were originally small and which tended to price-to-market in the wrong direction
in response to a relative cost shock. Because there ﬁrms stop exporting, they are no longer
included in the export price index. Symmetric arguments apply to the ﬁrms in country 2.
These results imply that for small shocks, the extensive margin is not quantitatively
important in generating our results. We have also found that our results do not change
40signiﬁcantly with large shocks to relative costs, despite the fact that these shocks generate
large changes in export participation.
V. Sensitivity Analysis
Here we examine the sensitivity of our model’s implications for pricing to changes in the
number of ﬁrms per sector, the median Herﬁndahl index across sectors, and the elasticities
η and ρ.
In our benchmark model we ﬁxed the number of domestic ﬁrms per sector, K,t o20.
With this parameterization, sectors in our model are quite small (smaller than the average
10-digit NAICS sector). We ﬁrst examine how our results change with a larger value of K.
If we had a continuum of ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o r ,t h e ne a c hﬁrm would have an inﬁnitesimal
market share and markups would be constant at ρ/(ρ − 1). Note that it is not necessarily
t h ec a s et h a ta l lﬁrms have vanishing market share (and thus a constant markup) as K
becomes large but remains ﬁnite. There are two eﬀects as K grows. The market share for
the typical ﬁrm shrinks, but the productivities of the few most productive ﬁrms grow. We
now show that it is possible to have a much larger value of K,h e r eK =1 0 0 , and still have
substantial deviations from relative PPP in our model.
We proceed with our analysis in two steps. We ﬁrst increase K from 20 to 100,k e e p i n gt h e
standard deviation of productivity draws θ constant at our benchmark level, and adjusting
D and F to match the same targets on trade volumes and export participation. Here,
holding D and F ﬁxed, increasing K leads to lower trade volumes and export participation,
so this calibration requires a lower D and F relative to the benchmark model. Under this
parameterization, the typical sector is less concentrated, with the median Herﬁndahl index
falling from 1500 to 900. Column 5 in Table 4 shows that this model produces smaller
aggregate deviations from relative PPP in response to a change in relative costs across
countries (the terms of trade moves by 67 percent, instead of 53 percent, relative to the PPI-
based RER), but these movements are still substantial relative to the model with constant
markups (where the ratio is equal to 100 percent).
41In the second step of our analysis, we increase θ to match the same median Herﬁndahl
index (1500) as in our benchmark model. Column 6 in Table 4 shows that this model produces
aggregate deviations from relative PPP that are even larger than in our benchmark model
(the movement in the terms of trade relative to the PPI-based RER is now 47 percent).
We conclude that choosing a small value of K is not critical for our ﬁndings. Instead,
it is important that we have a relatively high value of the Herﬁndahl index at the sectoral
level.
Now we consider sensitivity of our pricing results to the elasticity parameters η and
ρ. From the markup elasticity formula (23), it is clear that our model’s implications on
pricing-to-market depend on the gap in the elasticity parameters η and ρ.W ec o n s i d e rt w o
alternative parameterizations in which we reduce this gap. In the ﬁrst (column 7 in Table 4)
we set η =1 .5 and ρ =1 0 , and in the second (column 8 in Table 4) we set η =1 .01 and ρ =5 .
Both alternative parameterizations produce smaller aggregate deviations from relative PPP
( t h et e r m so ft r a d em o v eb y69 and 76 percent, respectively, relative to the PPI-based RER),
but these movements are still substantial relative to the model with constant markups.
We ﬁnish this section by brieﬂy discussing the sensitivity of our pricing results to two other
aspects of our model. We ﬁrst consider a variant of our model in which ﬁrm productivities
z are exponentially distributed as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). We ﬁnd that movements
in the terms of trade are smoother than in the lognormal case: they are only 39 percent as
large as the movement in the PPI-based RER.
Second, in our model the inclusion of the marginal trade cost D allows us to match the
observation that the majority of the domestic production of tradeable goods is also consumed
domestically. One can match this observation in a model with no marginal trade costs if one
is willing to assume home bias in consumption. We introduce this home bias by decreasing
the weight of foreign goods in sectoral output (equation 10). We ﬁnd that this model gives
very similar implications to our benchmark model.
42VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a model of international trade and international rela-
tive prices that is capable of matching many of the main features of the data on trade and
international relative consumer and producer prices. We have found that separation of na-
tional markets through trade costs and imperfect competition with variable markups leading
to pricing-to-market in those separate markets are both essential for generating deviations
from relative PPP at the aggregate level. With these deviations from relative PPP, our
model reproduces the smoothness of the terms of trade relative to the PPI-based RER and
that the CPI-based RER moves roughly one-to-one with the PPI-based RER.
In solving our model with the extensive margin (F>0), we speciﬁed that the driving
shock was a change in aggregate productivity so that we could solve for the ﬁrms’ exporting
decisions in general equilibrium. In a model with no extensive margin (F =0 ), one can solve
for equilibrium international relative prices purely as a function of international relative
costs. Hence, in such a model, one does not need to specify the source of the shock to
relative costs. Hence, the implications of such a model for international relative prices are
invariant to assuming either aggregate productivity shocks, or monetary shocks with sticky
nominal wages or limited participation, as the driving force of ﬂuctuations in international
relative costs.
Our model serves as a useful laboratory to examine which features of market structure
are most relevant in generating pricing-to-market. We ﬁnd that ﬁxed costs of exporting are
quantitatively not important for generating pricing-to-market in our benchmark model. We
have found instead that within-sector dispersion of market shares across ﬁrms is a critical
feature of market structure in generating quantitatively signiﬁcant pricing-to-market.
We see a need for further research concerning the modeling of pricing-to-market by ﬁrms.
We have found pricing-to-market in a simple variant of the standard CES demand system.
This result, however, is sensitive to the details of the model. It would be useful, in further
research, to develop a more general theory of this pricing behavior and to compare the
43implications of this theory to micro data on ﬁrm level prices.
In this paper we have looked to account for important features of the data on international
relative prices in a model in which ﬁrms’ prices are fully ﬂexible. One advantage of our
approach is that our model can generate persistent deviations from relative PPP in response
to persistent changes in the relative cost of production across countries. The main alternative
approach to account for deviations from relative PPP is based on models of sticky nominal
prices. In particular, in these models, it is assumed that some ﬁrms set prices in the domestic
currency for domestic sales and set prices in the foreign currency for exports. As a result,
if these nominal prices are sticky, these ﬁrms appear to price-to-market when the nominal
exchange rate changes. Thus, in this approach, the problem of accounting for deviations
from relative PPP is one of accounting for ﬁrms’ currency invoicing decisions when they
set their sticky prices.26 One important question in this framework is, why should currency
invoicing decisions with sticky nominal prices be so persistent? Perhaps these decisions are
persistent because they are close to being optimal. We see our framework as a natural one
for examining this question.
26See, for example, Engel (2006) and Linda S. Goldberg and Cedric Tille (2005) for a theoretical dis-
cussion of ﬁrms’ invoicing decisions when prices are sticky. See also Gita Gopinath, Oleg Itskhoki, and
Roberto Rigobon (2007) for empirical evidence of the relation between ﬁrms’ currency invoicing decisions
and incomplete pass-through for US import prices.
44Appendix
Price Indices
We measure the change in price indices using expenditure share—weighted averages of the
change in individual ﬁrm prices. Note that under this procedure, the change in the price
index from period t − 1 to period t includes only the price changes of individual ﬁrms that
have sales in both of those time periods. Measures of export and import prices using unit
values are constructed on the same principle of taking expenditure share—weighted averages
of price changes. Sample prices, however, are not collected at the most disaggregated level.
Instead, ratios of value to quantity are used in place of price observations at the lowest level
of disaggregation. In our model, since we can compute prices for individual goods, we use
these prices directly in constructing price indices.
We construct changes in aggregate price indices using the following deﬁnitions. In these
deﬁnitions, subscripts denote country, sector, and ﬁrm; variables without primes indicate
their level before the aggregate shock (our base year), and variables with primes indicate













































































































































Alessandria, George. 2004. “International Deviations from the Law of One Price: The
Role of Search Frictions and Market Share.” International Economic Review,4 5 ( 4 ) :
1263—1291.
Alvarez, Fernando, and Robert E. Lucas Jr. 2007. “General Equilibrium Analysis
of the Eaton-Kortum Model of International Trade.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
54(6): 1726—1768.
A n d e r s o n ,J a m e sE . ,a n dE r i cv a nW i n c o o p . 2004. “Trade Costs.” Journal of
Economic Literature, 42(3): 691—751.
Atkeson, Andrew, and Ariel Burstein. 2007. “Pricing-to-Market in a Ricardian Model
of International Trade.” American Economic Review, 97(2): 362—367.
Backus, David K., and Mario J. Crucini. 2000. “Oil Prices and the Terms of Trade.”
Journal of International Economics, 50(1): 185—213.
Backus, David K., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn Kydland. 1995. “International
Business Cycles: Theory vs. Evidence.” In Frontiers of Business Cycle Research,e d .
Thomas F. Cooley, 331—356. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bergin, Paul R., and Robert C. Feenstra. 2001. “Pricing-to-Market, Staggered
Contracts, and Real Exchange Rate Persistence.” Journal of International Economics,
54(2): 333—359.
Bergin, Paul R., and Reuven Glick. 2003. “Endogenous Nontradability and Macro-
economic Implications.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9739.
Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Samuel Kortum.
2003. “Plants and Productivity in International Trade.” American Economic Review,
93(4): 1268—1290.
47Bernard, Andrew B., and J. Bradford Jensen. 2004. “Entry, Expansion, and Inten-
sity in the US Export Boom 1987—1992.” Review of International Economics,1 2 ( 4 ) :
662—675.
Betts, Caroline, and Michael B. Devereux. 2000. “Exchange Rate Dynamics in a
Model of Pricing-to-Market.” Journal of International Economics, 50(1): 215—244.
Betts, Caroline M., and Timothy J. Kehoe. 2006. “US Real Exchange Rate Fluc-
tuations and Relative Price Fluctuations.” J o u r n a lo fM o n e t a r yE c o n o m i c s ,5 3 ( 7 ) :
1297—1326.
Bodnar, Gordon M., Bernard Dumas, and Richard C. Marston. 2002. “Pass-
through and Exposure.” Journal of Finance, 57(1): 199—231.
Burstein, Ariel, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2005. “Large Devalua-
tions and the Real Exchange Rate.” Journal of Political Economy, 113(4): 742—784.
Burstein, Ariel T., João C. Neves, and Sergio Rebelo. 2003. “Distribution Costs
and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics During Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations.” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 50(6): 1189—1214.
Chaney, Thomas. Forthcoming. “Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Mar-
gins of International Trade.” American Economic Review.
Chari, V.V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan. 2002. “Can Sticky Price
Models Generate Volatile and Persistent Real Exchange Rates?” Review of Economic
Studies, 69(3): 533—563.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. 2005.
“Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.” Journal
of Political Economy, 113(1): 1—45.
48Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Luca Dedola. 2005. “A Macroeconomic Model of Interna-
tional Price Discrimination.” Journal of International Economics, 67(1): 129—155.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Stanley Fischer, and Paul A. Samuelson. 1977. “Compar-
ative Advantage, Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of
Goods.” American Economic Review, 67(5): 823—839.
Dornbusch, Rudiger S. 1987. “Exchange Rates and Prices.” American Economic Review,
77(1): 93—106.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum. 2002. “Technology, Geography, and Trade.”
Econometrica, 70(5): 1741—1779.
Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum, and Francis Kramarz. 2004. “An Anatomy
of International Trade: Evidence from French Firms.” New York University Working
Paper.
Engel, Charles. 1999. “Accounting for US Real Exchange Rate Changes.” Journal of
Political Economy, 107(3): 507—538.
Engel, Charles. 2002. “Expenditure Switching and Exchange Rate Policy.” In NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2002, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth S. Rogoﬀ, 231—272.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Engel, Charles. 2006. “Equivalence Results for Optimal Pass-Through, Optimal Indexing
to Exchange Rates, and Optimal Choice of Currency for Export Pricing.” Journal of
the European Economic Association, 4(6): 1249—1260.
Feenstra, Robert C., Joseph E. Gagnon, and Michael M. Knetter. 1996. “Mar-
ket Share and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in World Automobile Trade.” Journal of
International Economics, 40(1—2): 187—207.
49Fitzgerald, Doireann. Forthcoming. “A Gravity View of Exchange Rate Disconnect.”
Journal of Monetary Economics.
Ghironi, Fabio, and Marc J. Melitz. 2005. “International Trade and Macroeconomic
Dynamics with Heterogeneous Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3): 865—
915.
Goldberg, Linda S., and Cedric Tille. 2005. “Vehicle Currency Use in International
Trade.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staﬀ Report 200.
Goldberg, Pinelopi K., and Michael M. Knetter. 1997. “Goods Prices and Exchange
Rates: What Have We Learned?” Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3): 1243—1272.
Gopinath, Gita, Oleg Itskhoki, and Roberto Rigobon. 2007. “Currency Choice
and Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 13432.
Hellerstein, Rebecca. 2006. “A Decomposition of the Sources of Incomplete Cross-
Border Transmission.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staﬀ Report 250.
Helpman, Elhanan, and Paul R. Krugman. 1985. Market Structure and Foreign
Trade: Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Knetter, Michael M. 1989. “Price Discrimination by US and German Exporters.” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 79(1): 198—210.
Knetter, Michael M. 1993. “International Comparisons of Price-to-Market Behavior.”
American Economic Review, 83(3): 473—486.
Krugman, Paul R. 1987. “Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes,” in
Real-Financial Linkages among Open Economies, e d . S v e nW .A r n d ta n dJ .D a v i d
Richardson, 49—70. London: MIT Press.
50Lapham, Beverly J. 1995. “A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis of Deviations from
the Laws of One Price.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19(8): 1355—1389.
Marston, Richard C. 1990. “Pricing to Market in Japanese Manufacturing.” Journal of
International Economics, 29(3—4): 217—236.
Melitz, Marc J. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggre-
gate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica, 71(6): 1695—1725.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoﬀ. 2000. “The Six Major Puzzles in Interna-
tional Economics: Is There a Common Cause?” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 7777.
Ravn, Morten O. 2001. “Imperfect Competition and Prices in a Dynamic Trade Model
with Comparative Advantage.” European University Institute Working Paper.
Stockman, Alan C., and Linda L. Tesar. 1995. “Tastes and Technology in a Two-
Country Model of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements.” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 85(1): 168—185.
Yang, Jiawen. 1997. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through in US Manufacturing Industries.”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(1): 95—104.
51          Table 1
      Volatility and Correlation of Manufacturing International Relative Prices
        Standard deviation relative to PPI / PPI*                 Correlation with PPI / PPI*
1234 5678
EPI / IPI PPI / EPI IPI / PPI* CPI / CPI* EPI / IPI PPI / EPI IPI / PPI* CPI / CPI*
Panel A: Yearly differences
  United States, 1985–2006 0.38 0.27 0.68 1.08 0.71 0.57 0.84 0.98
  United States, 1975–2006 0.46 0.32 0.67 1.10 0.66 0.45 0.82 0.97
  Japan, 1975–2006 0.45 0.53 0.42 1.08 0.53 0.87 0.72 0.99
  Germany, 1975–2003 0.58 0.38 0.69 0.95 0.73 0.24 0.70 0.97
  France, 1975–2003 0.39 0.64 0.66 0.91 0.23 0.70 0.70 0.81
  Italy, 1981–2003 0.65 0.69 0.72 1.11 0.31 0.59 0.54 0.98
  United Kingdom, 1975–2003 0.37 0.44 0.63 1.12 0.50 0.62 0.86 0.96
  Canada, 1975–2003 0.66 0.50 0.57 1.27 0.58 0.63 0.53 0.85
Panel B: HP-filtered quarterly data
  United States, 1985–2006 0.35 0.35 0.61 1.04 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.97
  United States, 1975–2006 0.46 0.34 0.60 1.02 0.72 0.55 0.81 0.96
  Japan, 1975–2006 0.42 0.51 0.44 1.09 0.53 0.89 0.74 0.99
  Germany, 1975–2003 0.58 0.35 0.64 0.96 0.76 0.23 0.75 0.97
  France, 1975–2003 0.36 0.58 0.68 0.95 0.29 0.67 0.74 0.86
  Italy, 1981–2003 0.62 0.66 0.70 1.07 0.39 0.53 0.59 0.99
  United Kingdom, 1975–2003 0.39 0.48 0.56 1.18 0.53 0.65 0.86 0.96
  Canada, 1975–2003 0.60 0.49 0.57 1.24 0.54 0.65 0.63 0.86
Note: All prices are quarterly and measured in US dollars. PPI: Manufacturing producer price index, PPI*: Trade-weighted manufacturing producer price index, EPI: Manufacturing export price index,
IPI: Manufacturing import price index, CPI: Consumer price index (goods for US 1985–2006, goods + services for the rest),
CPI*: Trade-weighted consumer price index (goods for US's 1985–2006 trading partners, and goods + services for the rest).
Sources: United States: EPI and IPI from Source OECD (1975–1985) and BLS (1986–2006), CPI and PPI from BLS; Japan: EPI, IPI, and PPI from Bank of Japan, CPI from Source OECD;
United Kingdom: EPI, IPI, and PPI from UK National Statistics, CPI from Source OECD; Germany, France, Italy, and Canada: EPI, IPI, PPI, and CPI from Source OECD.
Choice of trade partners is subject to data availability: US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK, Canada, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and India.
All price indices for remaining trade partners from Source OECD and IFS, except for Mexico (Banco de Mexico) and South Korea (Bank of Korea). Trade weights from OECD.                         Table 2
     Volatility and Correlation of Disaggregated International Relative Prices
Panel A: US import prices by source country i
Manufacturing industries
HP filtered quarterly, 1991–2006
(IPI source i / PPI i) and (PPI US / PPI i)





Source: Import prices and US PPI from BLS, foreign PPI and trade weights from OECD.
Panel B: US export prices by SIC industry j
39 four-digit manufacturing SIC industries, exports to all destinations
HP filtered quarterly, 1980–1992, subject to data availability by sector j
(PPI US j / EPI US j ) and (aggregate PPI US / aggregate PPI* trade weighted)






Standard deviation 0.40 0.33
Source: US export and producer prices from BLS, foreign PPI and trade weights from OECD.
Panel C: Japanese export prices by major manufacturing industry j
HP filtered quarterly, 1975–2006
(PPI Jap j / EPI Jap j ) and (aggregate PPI Jap / aggregate PPI* trade weighted)
Statistics Ratio of standard Correlations
across sectors deviations
Textiles 0.59 0.73
Chemicals and related products 1.02 0.73
Metals and related products 0.97 0.74
General machinery and equipment 0.38 0.92
Electrical machinery and equipment 0.63 0.92
Transportation equipment 0.66 0.90
Precision Instruments 0.41 0.49
Source: Japanese export and producer prices from Bank of Japan,
             foreign PPI and trade weights from OECD.                                                                                                               Table 3




Panel A: Parameter values




   D 1.45 1.58 1.00
   Share of labor force in export fixed costs (percent) 0.08 1.33 0.00
Panel B: Symmetric equilibrium implications US Data Source
   Exports / Manufacturing Gross Output (percent) 16.6 16.6 50.0 16.5 US Input-Output
   Fraction of exporting firms (percent) 24.8 25.6 100.0 25.0 BJ
   Median exporter's intensity (percent) 11.5 24.3 50.0 < 10 BEJK
   Average domestic exporter's sales / Average non-exporter's sales 14.9 4.8 n.a. 4.8 – 28 BEJK and EKK
   Average exporter's – non-exporter's log value added per worker (percent) 12.5 0.0 n.a. [15 – 33] BEJK
   Median Herfindahl index 1502 740 1367
   Weighted average markup (percent) 28.9 33.6 26.9
   Note: BJ: Bernard and Jensen (2004), BEJK: Bernard et al. (2003), EKK: Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz  (2004)


                                                     Table 4




Panel A: Terms of trade and PPI-based-RER
                      decomposition (percent contribution)
1 53.4 100.0 100.0
2 23.1 0.0 0.0
3 23.6 0.0 0.0
Change in price indices (percent)
4 0.86 1.00 0.76
5 0.69 1.00 0.76
6 0.31 0.00 0.23
7 0.14 0.00 0.23
Panel B: CPI-based-RER (percent)








CPI1 − CPI2 / PPI1 − PPI2
PPI2         Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
12 3 4 5678
Benchmark All firms export 10 percent 50 percent K = 100 K=100
model F=0 change in change in    at Herfindahl = 
relative costs relative costs benchmark 1500
Panel A: Parameter values
   K 20 20 20 20 100 100 20 20
0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.57 0.31 0.64
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.50 1.01
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5
   D 1.45 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.34 1.48 1.35 1.85
   Share of labor force in export fixed costs 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.27
Panel B: Symmetric equilibrium implications
   Exports / Manufacturing Gross Output 16.6 16.7 16.6 16.6 16.5 16.6 16.5 16.6
   Fraction of exporting firms 24.8 100.0 24.8 24.8 25.0 25.3 24.8 25.2
   Median Herfindahl index 1502 1493 1502 1502 900 1498 1513 1516
   Weighted average markup 29 29 29 29 21 29 22 42
Panel C: Change in relative marginal costs (percent) 111 05 01111
                       decomposition (percent contribution)
53.4 55.9 53.2 55.1 67.5 46.9 68.9 76.3
23.1 21.8 20.6 16.1 15.7 26.1 15.3 11.7
23.6 22.3 26.2 28.8 16.8 27.0 15.9 12.0









CPI1 − CPI2 / PPI1 − PPI2
  1.5  10Figure 1: U.S., Terms of Trade and Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rates






























Source of data: See Table 1
Manufacturing PPI-based RER
Manufacturing Terms of Trade










Histogram of firm markups
Figure 2: Symmetric equilibrium: markups and Herfindahl indices






















































Figure 3: Foreign market share and pricing-to-market by country 1 exporters, 1% increase in (W1/A1) / (W2/A2)